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Sequential Power-Dependence Theory
Vincent Buskens
Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Arnout van de Rijt
Department of Sociology, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook,
New York, USA
Existing methods for predicting resource divisions in laboratory exchange net-
works do not take into account the sequential nature of the experimental setting.
We extend network exchange theory by considering sequential exchange. We prove
that Sequential Power-Dependence Theory—unlike Power-Dependence Theory and
most other exchange theories—has a unique point prediction for resource divisions
in every network, and we show that these point predictions fare well in comparison
to those from established theories.
Keywords: exchange, power, sequentiality, social networks
1. INTRODUCTION
How well people do in social or economic exchange depends heavily on
how they are connected to potential exchange partners. This con-
clusion draws on a branch of sociology that seeks to answer the ques-
tion at what ratio two trading parties exchange if they are embedded
in a network of exchange relations (Willer, 1999). Willer provides an
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature in this field.
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Although there is variation in the precise experimental set-up used by
most empirical studies that test theories of network exchange, they
mostly use variants of the following experimental procedure.
Subjects are positioned at a networked computer. Subjects occupy
different positions in a network and interact in what we call a network
exchange game. In the network exchange game, a subject can make
offers to other subjects he is connected to in the network (neighbors)
as long as he has not already closed a deal with a neighbor. A subject
can also accept an offer from a neighbor, or confirm a neighbor’s
acceptance of an offer he made himself. An offer is a proposed division
of 24 profit points. Whenever an offer is accepted and confirmed, the
two subjects exchange; that is, they receive the share of the profit they
agreed upon. They are removed from the network. Thus, each subject
can close a deal with at most one neighbor in the network, which has
been called the ‘‘one-exchange rule.’’ Typically, this experimental pro-
cedure is repeated a number of times with the same subjects occupying
the same or different network positions.
Consider a network called the 3-Line (see Fig. 1). A node represents
a position and an edge a relation in which exchange might take place.
In the 3-Line, B can exchange with A and C, but A and C can exchange
only with B. Alternatively, in the 4-Line (see Fig. 1), B and C can
exchange with one another or with A and D, respectively, while A
and D can only exchange with one actor, namely, B and C, respect-
ively. Table 1 shows an imaginary bargaining sequence for the 4-Line
in the experimental setting outlined above.
At the beginning of the sequence, the 4-Line looks like the bottom
left structure in Figure 1. The first accepted and confirmed offer is
the (10, 14) division proposed by D to C at time 0:16. After their
exchange at time 0:21, the only remaining potential exchange is one
taking place between A and B. The network now looks like the bottom
right structure in Figure 1 and is essentially a dyad with two isolates.
McGrimmon and Dilks (2005) call this reduced network a ‘decay
product.’ The exchange between A and B occurs at time 0:42 after a
number of offers and counteroffers.
FIGURE 1 Top: 3-Line, before (left) and after (right) B and C exchanged;
bottom: 4-Line, before (left) and after (right) C and D exchanged.





































Numerous methods have been proposed to predict which subject
gets how much in which relation. These methods share one weakness:
They implicitly or explicitly assume that all exchanges take place sim-
ultaneously. Let’s go back to the 4-Line after C and D have exchanged
(right in Fig. 1). C and D can now no longer exchange. The only actors
that can still exchange after C and D closed their deal are the remain-
ing A and B. The situation is symmetric for A and B: Neither has an
alternative relation in which to exchange. They have equal bargaining
power. Clearly, they should be predicted to agree on a 12–12 split. Yet,
existing methods typically predict that B and C both obtain a majority
of the 24-point profit pool in their exchanges with A and D. One
notable exception is footnote 9 in Markovsky et al. (1988). In this foot-
note, the authors explicitly make a similar point as we make, namely,
that power positions might change if some actors have already
finished their exchanges. However, they first note that for small
networks the iterative method is not necessary. The example for the
4-Line above illustrates that also in small networks profit splits differ,
depending on which pair exchanges first and which one last. In
addition, Markovsky et al. (1988) claim that it suffices to recalculate
profit splits in reduced networks. In contrast, we argue that profit
splits in first exchanges are a direct consequence of what can still be
obtained in reduced networks. The anticipation of power loss in the
reduced 4-Line network should cause profit splits to be more equal
in the unreduced 4-Line. The power B derives from the ability to
exclude A has been recognized in past research, but the power A
TABLE 1 An Imaginary Bargaining Sequence
From To Kept Offered Type Time
A B 16 8 offer 0:07
C B 17 7 offer 0:08
B C 15 9 offer 0:12
D C 10 14 offer 0:16
C D 14 10 accept 0:19
D C 10 14 confirm 0:21
C D 14 10 exchange 0:21
A B 12 12 offer 0:23
B A 15 9 offer 0:26
A B 12 12 offer 0:28
B A 14 10 offer 0:32
A B 12 12 offer 0:35
B A 12 12 accept 0:40
A B 12 12 confirm 0:42
B A 12 12 exchange 0:42





































derives from B’s potential loss of this ability after a successful
exchange between C and D has been neglected.
The lack of attention to sequentiality in existing theoretical models
is particularly striking in full-information conditions. In some experi-
ments, information allows subjects to infer only for some of the other
subjects whether they have already exchanged. Under such con-
ditions, actors only know that as time goes by, their pool of alternative
exchange relations shrinks. For the majority of network exchange
experiments, however, all actors see the offers of all the other actors
in the network (see McGrimmon and Dilks, 2005, for details). It is then
obvious which actors have already closed a deal and which are still in
the process of negotiation.
In this article, we attempt to rectify this discrepancy. Using the
logic of Power-Dependence Theory (PDT), we provide new predictions
that take into account that after two actors have closed a deal, the bar-
gaining power of the remaining actors in the network might have
changed due to the fact that two actors are now ‘out of the network.’
We make separate predictions for the different orders in which non-
simultaneous exchanges can take place. For example, for the 4-Line,
we have one profit-split prediction for A and B if they exchange first
and another one if they exchange second.
We dub the adjusted theory Sequential Power-Dependence Theory
(SPDT). It turns out that the sequentiality correction has two
additional welcome consequences. We are able to prove that it provides
an earnings prediction for every actor in the network, and that each
prediction is single-valued.
The next section reviews PDT. In section 3, we introduce SPDT,
prove existence and uniqueness, and work out an example. Section 4
assesses SPDT’s goodness of fit and compares its performance with
that of other theories. The discussion section points out weaknesses
and suggests extensions of SPDT’s applicability to alternative
exchange settings.
2. POWER-DEPENDENCE THEORY
PDT stems from early work on exchange by Richard M. Emerson
(1962, 1964, 1972). He defined the power of an actor A over B as
equivalent to the dependence of actor B on A. B’s dependence on A
is the difference between the profit that he earns in exchange with
A and the profit he would earn if he would not exchange with A (also
known as ‘conflict point’, ‘disagreement point’, and ‘opportunity costs’).
The main thesis is that two parties will exchange at the rate at
which A’s dependence on B is equal to B’s dependence on A. Thus,





































in a bilateral monopoly, when A and B are the only actors, their
conflict points are zero. They are then predicted to divide exchange
benefits (or profit pool or surplus) equally. If they do so, A’s depen-
dence on B equals half the surplus minus zero and B’s dependence
on A equals half the surplus minus zero. This is referred to as the equi-
dependence principle. The principle was first applied to exchange net-
works by Stolte and Emerson (1977) and later by Cook and Emerson
(1978). In exchange networks, conflict points are often non-zero, so
that surpluses may become divided unevenly. An example is the 3-
Line (A–B–C), in which B can exchange with either A or C but not
both, and A and C cannot exchange with one another. B’s conflict point
in exchange with A is what he can get from C, and vice versa. It turns
out that there is a unique distribution of the two surpluses at which
there is equidependence in both relations, namely, when B gets the
entire surplus in either relation. Indeed, B’s dependence on A (C) is
then the entire surplus minus the entire surplus and C’s (A’s) depen-
dence on B is zero minus zero. In a special issue of Social Networks,
dedicated to exchange networks, Cook and Yamagishi (1992) introduce
an algorithm for determining equidependent exchange rates in any
experimental exchange network. For example, this algorithm gener-
ates profit splits 8–16, 8–8, and 16–8 in the 4-Line.1 How often each
exchange relation is used is left unspecified, except that suboptimal
relations are predicted to occur rarely. Suboptimal relations are rela-
tions that, if used, prevent the maximum number of exchanges in the
network from occurring. An example is the B–C relation in the 4-Line,
which reduces the total number of exchanges from 2 to 1.
The problem with this method, and with all other existing profit
prediction methods, is that it is a simultaneous-play model of sequen-
tial exchange: It requires that equidependence is reached in all rela-
tions simultaneously, while deals are made sequentially in the
network exchange experiment. In exchange relations that are used
after others have already exchanged, alternatives may be foregone.
Some actors have alternative exchange possibilities only as long as
these other neighbors have not already exchanged. For example, in
the 4-Line, knowledgeable middle actors are in a hurry, because a
dyad is left in which all bargaining power is lost after the other middle
actor has exchanged.
1Cook and Yamagishi (1992) predict ‘waste’ in some relations. For example, the 8–8
split implies that actors leave some money on the table, since they have 24 points at their
disposal. Yet, the experimental setting described before does not allow participants to
waste resources. The method we propose here, SPDT, precludes waste.





































One possible defense of PDT (and other theories that do not
explicitly take the sequentiality into account) is that the predictions
should be considered mere averages over differently timed exchanges
in multiple rounds of the experiment. The prediction 8–16 for A and B
in the 4-Line could, for example, represent an unweighed combination
of 4–20 splits in first exchanges and 12–12 splits in second exchanges.
However, this defense undermines the theoretical plausibility: Why
would average bargaining outcomes be equidependent while single
bargaining outcomes are not?
The SPDT method that we present in the next section takes the
sequentiality into account. SPDT has two additional advantages over
PDT. There are networks for which a wide range of PDT solutions
exist. An example is the Box network (see Fig. 2). Of course everybody
obtaining 12 in any exchange is a PDT solution, but also one pair of
unconnected actors obtaining 24 – x and the other two actors obtaining
x is a PDT solution. So, any distribution in which two unconnected
actors receive the same share and the others obtain the remainder is
equidependent. It turns out that a sequential conceptualization of net-
work exchange leads to a unique prediction.
The theory we present here does not need to be considered an exten-
sion or adaptation of earlier versions of PDT. What we borrow here is
the idea that actors exchange according to an equal gain principle rela-
tive to some well-defined conflict points. This corresponds with the
Nash solution (Nash 1953) in general bargaining theory (see also
Braun and Gautschi 2006; Van Assen 2001: ch. 7 provides an exten-
sive overview of the commonalities between network exchange the-
ories and more general bargaining principles). We define the conflict
points based on what two actors can obtain in the network if they as
a pair would not exchange first, that is, if one of the other pairs
would exchange first. In this manner, we obtain conflict points as a
FIGURE 2 Example networks.





































consequence of taking the sequentiality of the exchanges seriously. In
the next section, we show that just this conceptualization of equide-
pendence alone is sufficient to generate a unique feasible profit distri-
bution for every relation in every network.
3. SEQUENTIAL POWER-DEPENDENCE THEORY
Let X ¼ ðxijÞ be an n n symmetric network, with xij ¼ xji ¼ 1 if actors
i and j can exchange, 0 otherwise. Let NðXÞ ¼ ffi; jgjxij ¼ 1g be the set
of ties in network X, where ties are two-element subsets of the set of
all actors, and let N ¼ jNðXÞj be the cardinality of this set. Xnfi; jg
is the network X with the ith and jth column and row deleted, i.e.,
with i and j and all their relations removed from the network.
viðXÞ is the value of network X to actor i, which we define as i’s
expected value across all his relations. If i is expected to earn all of
the 24 points, viðXÞ ¼ 1, while if he is expected to earn 12 points on
average, viðXÞ ¼ 1=2.2 Let pij be the probability that i and j are the
first to exchange. Because only actors that have a link can exchange,
pij ¼ 0 if fi; jg 62 NðXÞ. Because exactly one pair will exchange first,P
i
P
j>i pij ¼ 1. We denote pijkl ¼ pkl=ð1 pijÞ as the conditional prob-
ability that k and l are the first to exchange if i and j are not. We define
pijkl ¼ 0 if pij ¼ 1, which corresponds below with i and j dividing the
profit pool equally if they have to exchange with each other, which
should be the case because they both do not have an alternative. It
follows that viðXÞ ¼ vjðXÞ ¼ 1=2 if n ¼ 2 and xij ¼ xji ¼ 1 (a dyad).
Furthermore, viðXÞ ¼ 0 for any actor i without any ties. We define
siij as the share an actor i obtains if he is involved in the first exchange
with actor j. Because the profit pool is always distributed in its
entirety, sjij ¼ 1 siij. If i is not involved in the first exchange, but
instead j and k are, then he receives what he can obtain in Xnfj; kg.
For our example of the 4-Line, in the situation after C and D have
exchanged, right in Figure 1, the 4-Line has been transformed into a
dyad. A and B thus earn 1=2 each. Alternatively, for the 3-Line (see
also Fig. 1), A will earn 0 after B and C have exchanged.













2We transfer the rather arbitrary profit pool of 24 points here to a 0–1 scale via the
value function. Our theory does not depend on the number of points to be divided, and it
assumes that the pie to be divided, can be divided in a continuous manner.





































where the values for pij are given. Now, suppose that for a certain
network size n, we know each value vi for each actor i of each network
of smaller size. Then, in order to be able to calculate the values of a
network of size n for all actors in that network, what remains to be
done is computing the siij. Consider the case that i and j exchange first.
We now apply the equidependence principle that each actor gets his
expected value of the conflict point plus half of the remainder of the
profit pool (this remainder might be a negative amount). More pre-
cisely, i’s value of the conflict point in an exchangewith j is what iwould
have gotten if i and j would not have been the first to exchange. This is
what i gets in the case of each of the other relations exchanging first,
weighted by the corresponding probabilities of first exchange.3 In a for-











in which the first term concerns the sum of shares for i if i exchanges
with someone else in the first opportunity and the second term con-
cerns i’s expected values when not exchanging first. A similar for-
mula holds for j and the equidependence principle then implies
that the difference between the shares in a first exchange between
i and j should be the same as the difference between their expected
values if they would not exchange with each other. Thus,
siij  sjij ¼
X
k 6¼i;j
pijikðsiik  vjðXnfi; kgÞÞ þ
X
k 6¼i;j











pijikðsiik  vjðXnfi; kgÞÞ þ
X
k 6¼i;j






pijklðviðXnfk; lgÞ  vjðXnfk; lgÞÞ; ð4Þ
The right-hand side of Equation (3) consists of three parts. The first
part indicates the difference between how much i and j would obtain
if i and an other actor than j were the first to exchange. The second
3Cook and Yamagishi (1992) assume an actor’s conflict point to be the maximum he
can earn in any of his other relations, while we use the expected value using the prob-
abilities of the alternatives.





































part indicates the difference between what i and j would obtain if j
and an other actor than i were the first to exchange. The third part
indicates the difference between what i and j would obtain if two
other actors exchanged first. The difference between the shares of i
and j when they exchange first is assumed equal to the difference
in the expected shares of i and j when they do not exchange first.
The small rearrangement in equation (4) uses the requirement that
the proportions the two actors obtain sum to 1. A similar equation
holds for every exchange relation fi; jg in the network X.
Consider Equation (3) for the two potential exchange in the 3-Line
in Figure 1:
sAAB  sBAB ¼ 0 sBBC and ð5Þ
sBBC  sCBC ¼ sBAB  0: ð6Þ
Equation (5) equates the difference between what A and Bwould obtain
if they exchanged first with the difference between what A and B would
obtain if B and C exchanged first. Equation (6) equates the difference
between what B and C would obtain if they exchanged first with the
difference between what B and C would obtain if A and B exchanged
first. The zeros arise because A and C do not obtain anything if, respect-
ively, B and C or A and B exchange first. Taking into account that the
shares of two actors adds up to 1 we can rearrange the two equations
above to there respective equations corresponding to Equation (4):
2sAAB ¼ 1 sBBC and ð7Þ
2sBBC ¼ 2 sAAB: ð8Þ
This system of two equations in two unknowns is easily solved and it
follows that sAAB ¼ 0 and sBBC ¼ 1. This implies that B obtains 1whatever
relation exchanges, while B and C obtain 0 if they are involved in the
exchange but also if they are not involved. Consequently, the value of
their network position equals 0 for A andC, and 1 for themiddle actor B.
Switching to the 4-Line, things become a bit more complicated.
Now, for the exchange between A and B Equation (3) is












because there are two other possible ties. If B and C exchange first,
A will be excluded and obtains 0. If C and D exchange first, the dyad
AB is the decay product and A and B will both obtain 1=2. Because B





































and C have equivalent positions, they will obtain both 1=2 if they are
the first to exchange. This implies that the equation above can be
solved directly and that A obtains 3=8 in a first exchange, while B
obtains 5=8. Therefore, the value for A of this network equals the
weighted sum of A’s share when A and B exchange first, A’s share
when B and C exchange first, and A’s share when C and D exchange
first: 1=3 3=8þ 1=3 0þ 1=3 1=2 ¼ 7=24, assuming that all ties are
equally likely as a first exchange. Similarly, the value for B and C
equals 13=24 in the 4-Line, while the value for D is again 7=24.
In general, a network with N ties will lead to N equations with
N unknown variables siij using the known expected values of
actors in smaller networks. The corresponding system of linear equa-
tions As ¼ c hasA asN Nmatrix of coefficients and c as vector of con-
stants. For any network, the following theorem holds for these N
equations.
Theorem 1. For parameters pij and given network values in smaller
networks viðXnfi; jgÞ, the system As ¼ c always has a unique solution,
and this solution satisfies 0  siij  1 for all fi; jg in NðXÞ.
Proof. The proof is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 1, thus, indicates that the set of equations that have to be
solved to obtain the SPDT exchange values has a unique solution. The
proof indeed establishes that the parameters of the equations ensure
that none of the equations is a linear combination of the others, which
is enough for the solution to exist and to be unique. The second part of
the proof shows that the solution is also always in the correct range;
that is, all the predicted siij are between 0 and 1. For any nonreduced
or reduced network and for any tie in the remaining network, we have
a unique prediction for how two actors will divide what they have to
divide. Using the probabilities for first exchange pij, one can then also
obtain each actor’s expected value in a given network.
As a last example, we take a detailed look at the so-called ‘Box-
Stem’ (see Fig. 2). This network has six actors, A through F, and six
ties: NðXÞ ¼ ffA;Bg; fA;Cg; fB;Dg; fC;Dg; fD;Eg; fE;Fgg. We assume
we have already calculated the values of networks with 4 actors. If A
and B exchange first they obtain sAAB and s
B
AB ¼ 1 sAAB. Then a 4-Line
remains in which actors C through F expect to earn 7=24, 13=24,
13=24, and 7=24 in that order as we have explained above. These
are the six entries in the first row of Table 2. We repeat this procedure
for all other rows in a similar manner. The smaller subnetworks that
we find after an exchange are the Box, the 3-Line, the dyad, and the





































isolate. Except for the Box, we have already explained the expected
values for all these networks. In the Box the value for everyone is
1=2 because everyone has an equivalent position. This leads to the
following list of exchange possibilities in Table 2 in which the entry
in, for example, column A and row AB represents the expected value
for A if A and B would exchange first.
Now we derive the six equidependence equations. We assume for
this example that all relations are equally likely to be the first to be
used (the existence and uniqueness of the solution do not depend on
that assumption). For the exchange between A and B should hold


































Similarly, the other five equations can be derived. Then the solution
to this system of six linear equations in six unknowns can be calcu-
lated: sAAB ¼ 0:65, sAAC ¼ 0:65, sBBD ¼ 0:39, sCCD ¼ 0:39, sDDE ¼ 0:51, and
sEEF ¼ 0:60. These values eliminate all unknowns from Table 2, so that
the weighted column averages are now the expected profit shares of
the six actors. Since we assumed that all dyads were equally likely
to be first, all the weights (pij) are equal to 1=6. For actor A we have
vA ¼ 1
6
ð0:65þ 0:65þ 0:5þ 0:5þ 1þ 0:5Þ ¼ 0:63: ð12Þ
Similarly, we obtain vB ¼ 0:34, vC ¼ 0:34, vD ¼ 0:55, vE ¼ 0:53, and
vF ¼ 0:33 for the other actors.
Alternatively, we can compute average earnings per relation, that
is, how two actors in any particular relation on average split their
TABLE 2 Profit matrix for the Box-Stem
First exchange A B C D E F
AB sAAB 1 sAAB 7=24 13=24 13=24 7=24
AC sAAC 7=24 1 sAAC 13=24 13=24 7=24
BD 1=2 sBBD 1=2 1 sBBD 1=2 1=2
CD 1=2 1=2 sCCD 1 sCCD 1=2 1=2
DE 1 0 0 sDDE 1 sDDE 0
EF 1=2 1=2 1=2 1=2 sEEF 1 sEEF





































profit pool. To obtain this number for A and B in the Box-Stem we
cannot simply average columns A and B. Some of this profit is not
earned in the A–B relation. We must weigh each entry by the prob-
ability that it is earned in the A–B relation. For example, with 1=6
chance A and B exchange first and A earns 0.65 in his relation with
B. With another 1=6 chance, he earns 1=2 in his relation with B,
namely when C and D exchange first. With 1=12 chance, he earns 1
in his relation with B, namely when D and E exchange first and A deci-
des to exchange with B rather than C. Last, with 1=12 chance he earns
1=2 in exchange with B, namely when the Box remains after E and F
exchange first and A and B indeed decide to exchange. Thus, A and B
are expected to exchange with probability 1=6þ 1=6þ 1=12þ
1=12 ¼ 1=2. To assess the expected profit for A in the A–B relation,
we have to calculate the conditional probabilities of each of the four
events above. Hence, given that A and B exchange, A earns 0.65 with
probability 1=6=1=2 ¼ 1=3. With probability (1=6þ 1=12Þ=ð1=2Þ ¼ 1=2
he earns 1=2, and with probability ð1=12Þ=ð1=2Þ ¼ 1=6 he earns 1 in
the A–B relation. This yields an average expected profit of 0.63 for
A given that he exchanges with B. These relation earnings are the
predictions we use in the next section to assess the empirical perform-
ance of SPDT.
4. EMPIRICAL PERFORMANCE
Table 3 compares SPDT’s predictions with observed predictions
reported in Willer and Emanuelson (2005) and with those from three
other methods, including PDT. The value difference with SPDT indi-
cates the improvement in fit resulting from taking sequentiality into
account. Another is EVT, the latest version of which was presented
in Friedkin (1995). The last is Elementary theory (ET), which Willer
and Emanuelson (2005) found to empirically outperform the nine
other theories they considered. The predictions are the average earn-
ings of the first-listed actors in the specified dyads.
SPDT with equal probabilities of first exchange (SPDT-Equal) does
worse than the empirically most competitive method ET. It has four
predictions that are more than 1 point off the observed value and
the error, measured by the sum of absolute deviations, is higher,
12.11 instead of 3.45. Striking is the bad fit for the B–A relation in
the K-Stem. SPDT-Equal predicts actor B to earn a greater share than
B does in the laboratory. One could investigate whether the deviation
is due to the equiprobability assumption. Perhaps this tie or other ties
are more or less often used in first exchange in the laboratory. Still,
SPDT-Equal ranks among the better fitting theories that Willer and





































Emanuelson (2005) compare (e.g., Bienenstock and Bonacich, 1992;
Yamaguchi, 1996; Burke, 1997; Braun and Gautschi, 2006).
SPDT-Equal outperforms PDT as well as EVT. PDT has a total
error of 32.79, while EVT has a total error of 31.72. This suggests that
the sequentiality correction is not only theoretically but also empiri-
cally worthwhile. This correction is in 9 out of 11 cases in the
egalitarian direction; the high-power actor earns less under SPDT-
Equal rules than under PDT rules. The sequentiality correction is
sometimes too weak, and never too strong, for the investigated net-
works. As the figures show, actors in more advantageous positions in
the network usually earn in the lab less or about as much as SPDT-
Equal predicts. The overestimation would be slightly reduced if we
had taken into account that the most unequal deal subjects in the
lab can strike is 23–1, and not 24–0.4
TABLE 3 Comparison of point predictions with other methods (ED and PDT
are taken from Willer and Emanuelson (2005)) EVT is own recalculation based
on Dogan et al. (2007) implementation of EVT
Network Dyad ET PDT EVT SPDT-Equal SPDT-Random OBS
4-Line B–A 13.50 16.00 16.04 13.50 13.00 13.58
Stem B–A 14.40 18.00 18.43 14.57 14.94 14.41
D-Box B–A 12.90 12.00 15.13 13.00 13.20 12.80
K-Stem B–A 14.50 20.00 18.44 18.01 17.83 13.69
Borg-6 B–A 13.50 18.00 16.21 14.75 14.96 14.02
D–E 14.40 18.00 18.36 16.49 16.12 14.52
L5-Stem B–A 13.20 16.00 15.26 12.89 12.98 12.91
C–F 14.30 16.00 17.60 14.75 13.60 13.72
Box-Stem A–B 12.60 12.00 14.13 15.17 14.08 12.71
D–B 12.60 12.00 14.13 13.62 12.73 12.82
E–F 13.30 18.00 15.86 13.03 13.14 12.69
Sum of errors 3.45 32.79 31.72 12.11 10.39
The table reports the profit the first-mentioned actor earns. ET ¼ Elementary Theory
(Willer and Anderson, 1981; Willer and Emanuelson, 2005), PDT ¼ Power-Dependence
Theory (Cook and Yamagishi, 1992); EVT ¼ Expected Value Theory (Friedkin, 1995);
SPDT-Equal ¼ Sequential Power-Dependence Theory with each tie equally likely to be
the first tie to exchange; SPDT-Random: SPDT with the likelihood for the first tie actors
randomly seeking neighbors (see next section); OBS ¼ the average observed value in all
but the first periods of the laboratory experiment.
4Also in strong-power networks such as the 3-Line, SPDT predicts too extreme values
for the exchanges. A clear candidate for explaining this overestimation of earning differ-
ences is by including some form of inequality aversion, which is a well-known adaptation
of the standard model to understand behavior in experimental settings (see, e.g.,
Fehr and Gintis 2007, for a recent overview).





































Even though we have eliminated the problems of simultaneity and
non-uniqueness, the necessity of an assumption on the likelihood that
an exchange relation is used first for generating an actor’s expected
value remains. So far we have used the default assumption of equal
probabilities of first exchange. The SPDT predictions in Table 3 are
based on this assumption. We thus predict what we would observe
under the equidependence rule in a laboratory experiment in which
pairs of connected actors are randomly selected and forced to
exchange. In actual laboratory experiments, subjects may exchange
in some relations more often than in others.
In Table 3, we also list SPDT predictions using a random seek
mechanism in which actors choose randomly between their partners
and if some pairs of two connected actors choose each other, one pair
is chosen again randomly to exchange first (SPDT-Random). If no pair
of actors choose each other they just try again. Using these alternative
probabilities we obtain slightly different predictions as one can see in
Table 3.5 The fit with the random seek probabilities is a bit better for
these networks although not for all relationships. The overall improve-
ment comes from the fact that actors with few ties (especially those
with only one tie) find partners with a higher likelihood. The smaller
probability of being excluded increases their bargaining power and
makes them obtain a bit more and their neighbors a bit less. Neverthe-
less, the differences between SPDT-Equal and SPDT-Random predic-
tions are mostly small. We experimented with more variants of
probabilities also including the probabilities on which Friedkin’s
(1995) EVT is built, but it seems that our predictions do not strongly
depend on the precise values of the probabilities.
Although ET still predicts better than SPDT in the evidence at
hand, we do not consider this a final defeat for SPDT, because it is
unclear how representative the set of networks in Table 3 is. A critical
test between SPDT and ET would involve a set of carefully chosen
uninvestigated networks for which predictions between the theories
vary maximally. As long as such a test is not available, we feel that
SPDT deserves the benefit of the doubt. In parsimony it outclasses
ET, unambiguously deduced from a smaller set of theoretical axioms,
and guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of predicted values in all
possible networks.
5Predicted values of first exchanges as well as values of network positions for all
actors are available from the authors for all networks with eight or less actors. Predic-
tions are available for equal as well as these randomized probabilities of first exchange
and also for starting probabilities that exclude some ties as discussed in the discussion
section.






































Most theories for predicting network exchange assume simultaneous
exchange and do not predict unique resource divisions for each dyad
in a network. We introduced Sequential Power-Dependence Theory
that assumes sequential exchange and does predict unique resource
divisions for each dyad in a network. SPDT thus constitutes a worth-
while theoretical and empirical addition to existing network exchange
theories. Although the calculative procedure becomes laborious for lar-
ger networks due to the recursive definition, the baseline assumptions
are few and they are straightforward. We have proven that the theory
provides a unique prediction for exchange outcomes given any set of
probabilities with which ties exchange first.
SPDT was found empirically competitive with existing methods
using the most straightforward assumption that all ties are equiprob-
able in first exchange. That this is an untenable assumption for some
networks is known from experimental data. Fortunately, we found our
profit predictions to vary little across probability methods. Even with
equiprobability in the first exchange, we strongly improved on most
network exchange theories.
We did not provide explicit theory on what the probabilities of first
exchange should be, on purpose. Several types of methods for generat-
ing such probabilities have been proposed in the literature, and SPDT
generates unique profit predictions for every network using any of
these probability methods. However, the existing methods are not
based on an assumption of rational action. They do not specify prob-
abilities with which actors maximize earnings. Yet many exchange
theories, including SPDT, do employ the notion of a rational, profit-
maximizing actor. This theoretical inconsistency is dissatisfying. Find-
ing optimal probabilities is therefore an important task. It is also a
difficult task, as we have argued here. It requires the specification of
a game that resembles the experimental exchange setting used so
far and in which actors strategically choose probabilities of exchange
seek. Ideally, one might identify also a unique set of optimal probabil-
ities in that game, but probably there are many rational solutions for
that problem. Outcomes of such a game might depend on very subtle
changes in experimental settings and, therefore, might be different
for various experiments done in the past. Furthermore, the technical
derivation of such solutions is complex and laborious and is beyond
the scope of this article.
Considerations about the probabilities should also take into account
that, in some relations, actors never wish to exchange. Such relations
are often called ‘breaks’ (Markovsky et al., 1988; see also Simpson and





































Willer, 1999; Girard and Borch, 2003). The classic example is the
T-network in which a dyad is linked to the middle actor of a 3-Line.
If the relation between the dyad and the 3-Line did not exist, the
middle actor in the 3-Line would earn 1 and the actors in the dyad
1=2. In the T-network they must split 1, earning less. For any positive
probability of exchange in the relation that connects the dyad to
the middle actor of the 3-Line, the two actors involved in this link
both lose as a result of this link. Also, the predicted expected values
from our model give rise to situations in which actors who have to
exchange first would have preferred not to have had this tie. However,
identifying those ties again depends on the precise setup of the
exchange setting. Still, if one would like to change some probabilities
to zero, this does not change the fact that our method produces unique
predictions.
A strong test of our theory could come from reanalyzing some exist-
ing data on network exchange in settings in which actors can observe
which other deals are closed and for which the order in which deals
were made was recorded. One could test predictions from SPDT-Equal
about differences in exchange in specific dyads depending on the
timing of the exchange in this dyad. Does the second dyad to exchange
in the 4-Line exchange at a more equal rate than the first dyad does?
McGrimmon and Dilks (2005) provide an experiment using the 7-Line
that provides data that are suitable to test also our theory. The
results as presented in the paper at least seem in correspondence with
what our theory would predict when comparing earlier with later
exchanges in the 7-Line. Alternatively, one could test how well the
theory performs under the observed probabilities of first exchange.
Clearly such a test would not provide a fair comparison to other the-
ories for network exchange, but it would give an indication of how well
the equidependence principle fared if one knew the likelihoods of first
exchanges.
The theory can also be extended in scope to exchange settings other
than the one that is usually studied in the laboratory. The application
to exchange settings in which actors can exchange more than once or
have multiple connections to the same neighbor (Willer, 1999: ch. 8) is
straightforward. We simply add these relations to the system of linear
equations. Exchange can also be inclusive rather than exclusive or
involve profit pools of unequal size (Willer, 1999: ch. 8). Making SPDT
applicable to these exchange settings can be done by changing the iter-
ative procedure. For example, if actors can have more exchanges per
time period, one cannot just remove two complete actors from the net-
work after an exchange, but one can remove the relation. After that,
the remaining network with exchange possibilities needs to be





































updated accordingly. The recursive procedure requires more steps and
proving that one obtains again a unique solution is far from straight-
forward. We leave these challenges to future research.
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The rows and columns of the matrix A are labelled with double indices
ij referring to the dyads fi; jg with i < j. Thus aij;kl refers to the coef-
ficient before the variable skkl in the equation belonging to fi; jg
exchanging first. In equation (3) one can see that the diagonal ele-
ments are all aij;ij ¼ 2. The off-diagonal elements aij;kl are equal to 0,
pijkl, or pijkl. Namely, 0 if k 6¼ i, k 6¼ j, l 6¼ i, and l 6¼ j; pijkl if k ¼ j or
l ¼ i; and pijkl if k ¼ i or l ¼ j. Now one can obtain an upperbound
for the sum of the absolute values of the off-diagonal coefficients in










¼ ð1 pijÞ=ð1 pijÞ
¼ 1 < 2 ¼ jaij;ijj:
In words, for every row, the sum of the absolute values of the off-
diagonal elements is smaller than the absolute value of the diagonal
element. This property of matrices is referred to as (strict) diagonal
dominance. The Levy-Desplanques theorem (see, e.g., Horn and
Johnson, 1994: 302) states that diagonally dominant matrices are
invertible. Therefore, As ¼ c has a unique solution.
We know now that there is a unique solution, but this is not suf-
ficient, because the only feasible values for all siij lie in the interval
[0,1], because the values represent the proportions actors obtain from
the profit pool. Strict diagonal dominance is also a sufficient condition
for the so-called Jacobi method to converge (see, e.g., Varga, 1962). The
Jacobi method is an iterative procedure to solve sets of linear equations.
Using this, we can prove the existence of a feasible solution by induc-
tion. For n ¼ 1; 2 the solution is feasible, because siij ¼ 0 for isolates
and siij ¼ sjij ¼ 1=2 for two actors in the dyad. Now suppose n > 2 and
the solutions are feasible for all networks of size smaller than n. In
the Jacobi method, one expresses an entry of the solution vector in the
current iteration t > 0, si;tij , as a function of the other entries in the
previous iteration t 1, sk;t1kl . Rewriting Equation (3) accordingly























































pijkl viðXnfk; lgÞ vjðXnfk; lgÞ
 
: ð13Þ
One then guesses an initial solution, e.g., s0 ¼ 1=2, so that for t ¼ 0,
we have feasibility. Now suppose si;t1ij is feasible for all fi; jg. Because of
feasibility of both vi in smaller networks and s
i;t1
ij for all fi; jg and
Rfk;lgp
ij
kl ¼ 1, the right-hand side of Equation (4) is now aweightedmean
of elements that are all in the interval [ 1,1], and, therefore, the right-
hand side of Equation (4) has itself a value in the interval [1,1].
Therefore 1  2si;tij  1  1, which is equivalent to 0  si;tij  1. Thus,
si;tij is an element of [0,1] and also feasible. Solutions are therefore
feasible for any n, which proves Theorem 1.
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